



2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association

271 Shady Oak Drive
New Market, AL 35761
<<http://www.2-71adataiwan.com>>



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Newsletter 2

July 2003


2004 Reunion Site Visit

In the last newsletter, we mentioned that **Karl** and **Pat Kolm** came down from Waco to help **Bob** and **Lois Mackintosh** with the hotel site selection process. Here is a picture of the group at the Adam's Mark Hotel in San Antonio.




Bob and Lois Mackintosh with Karl and Pat Kolm

e-mail to bmack@ardmore.net. Non-members, who served with us on Taiwan, may receive the same addresses by enclosing a small donation (\$1.00) with your request to cover the cost of mailing.





Renewed Memberships

Astin, John, Pompano Beach, FL (C Btry-Sig)
Drum, Connie, Eutawville, SC (178 Ord)
Garcia, C. Louis, Buena Vista, NM (Hq Btry)
Hodge, Norris "Nick" C., Marianna, AR (C Btry)
Johnson, Mrs. Robert E., McComb, MS (Hq Btry)
Lewis, Nat, El Paso, TX (B Btry)
Leyder, Don, Mechanicsburg, PA (Hq Btry)
Magnus, Ralph, New York, NY (A Btry)
Martinez, Filimon, Denver, CO (C Btry)
Mayer, John, Osage, IA (D Btry)
Phillips, S.L., Mt. Pleasant, NC (C Btry)
Provost, John, Mount Dora, FL (Hq Btry)
St. Amour, Leo, Havre de Grace, MD (C Btry)
Wilson, Wes, El Paso, TX (B Btry)



In Memoriam

James L. Millwood, Gibson, GA (31st Engr)
Stephen W. Woomer, Phoenix, MD (178 Ord Det)



Contact your old buddies

Those who attended the Nashville reunion last year received a copy of our mailing roster for members and non-members. If you did not attend the reunion, you may want a copy of the Association mailing list with addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and unit affiliation. Members should send a note to 2nd Missile Bn, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Assn, 271 Shady Oak Drive, New Market, AL 35761, or

Notes from the Troops

4/6/03

From: **Jimmie Rogers** (D Btry)

Bob,

Did you get my dues for 2003? Hope this finds you and Lois doing fine, we are doing OK. The allergy is in full bloom here in NM. Hope your weather is better.

Don sent yours and Dave's E-Mail addresses to his friend in San Antonio. Have you heard from him? (Regarding a reunion hotel) Don hasn't. Hope you all can find us a good place for the next reunion. We are looking forward to it.

Don is really looking forward to the next one. He really enjoyed the one in Nashville. He knows now what it

was all about.

You all have a nice spring and summer.
Waiting to hear from you all and get the next newsletter.
As ever,
Jimmie and Ruth Ann Rogers

4/29/03

From: **Leo St. Amour** (C Btry)

Dear Bob,

Enclosed are my dues plus a little help-out on postage or wherever it is needed.

Sorry I'm late. Guess you probably start wondering when a member does not renew on time; none of us getting any younger.

Hope to be able to make the next reunion.

Sincerely,

Leo R. St. Amour

4/30/03

From: **C. Louis Garcia** (Hq Btry)

Dear Bob,

I received the newsletter and was encouraged to send my dues, and possibly attend the San Antonio reunion, God willing.

Comrade,

C. Louis Garcia

5/1/03

From: **Mrs. Robert E. Johnson**

Dear Sir,

Enclosed check for dues and for the Misc Fund. I forgot the date to send in the money 'til I heard from you. Sorry!

On May 1st, 2002 Robert was in ICU at Hattiesburg, Miss. Hospital. I was thinking of you and the older friends. With the newsletter coming yesterday, helps me a lot. The mention of Robert and the clip board by Jim Telford (A Btry) was good! Robert still carried a notepad and 3 pens in his pocket all the time. He would unload the pockets to weigh for the dialysis machine (18 years). This month of May is a bit hard for me, I am OK. It is like Robert is overseas and the year tour will soon be up. Our son Robert E. died in El Paso, TX 5/23/1958. Then Bob (Robert) died 5/10/03.

I have had no trouble and am able to do all that has to be done. I'll have knee surgery (knee replacement) end of June. Couldn't do this when Bob needed me all the time.

I hope your reunion continues on. Your newsletter yesterday made me feel remembered. Thanks!

Good Luck to you all. Thank you.

In Christian Love,

Mrs Robert E. Johnson (Geraldine)

5/1/03

From: **Bob Burlage** (D Btry)

Dear Bob & Lois,

We received the newsletter today and were glad to hear about the reunion plans for 2004. We are looking forward to San Antonio.

We moved last summer and I have been negligent about getting our new address to you...

We appreciate all the time and effort you put in each reunion.

Sincerely,

Bob & Marilyn Burlage

5/1/03

From: **Eva (Nat) Lewis** (B Btry)

I am so sorry for not paying on time, it was an oversight on my part. Please renew the membership of my husband.

He is always so happy to get the newsletter and hear from everybody. Nat has severe COPD and I have a very busy schedule, with taking care of him and still working 8 hours a day.

I apologize and thanks again.

Eva Lewis

5/28/03

From: **S.L. Phillips** (C Btry)

Dear Bob,

I really enjoy the newsletters and appreciate the work and time you, Lois and anyone else that helps with it.

Enclosing a self addressed envelope. Please send me James Pannell's address.

Thanks again for all the hard work.

S.L.Phillips

6/8/03

From: **John Mayer** (D Btry)

Dear Robert,

Sorry to be so late with this dues payment. I'm sure glad you haven't canceled me yet. In fact, I believe as late as I am, I'll send in next year's dues now too.

I still enjoy each newsletter and read them cover to cover.

To you Bob, and all the officers, a big "thank you" and keep up the great job.

Sincerely,

John H. Mayer

7/14/03

From: **Filimon Martinez** (C Btry)

Dear Bob & Lois,

We hope all is well with you.

We were really sorry to have missed the Nashville reunion. We were looking forward to that. But sometimes things happen and we have to change everything. Filimon's kidneys failed so he is on dialysis three times a week for four hours each day, so it's hard on him; and then we lost our daughter-in-law to cancer. She was 34 years old. Our youngest son's wife, so it's been a pretty tough year. But hopefully we can make it to San Antonio.

We were really sorry for all of the people that have passed away. Our sympathy to their families.


Keep up your hard work. You guys are great.

Here we are sending you the money for the dues, sorry

it's so late.

Thank you so much for the newsletters; we really appreciate it. Looking forward to see you all soon.

Filimon and Eleanor Martinez



USMC

IN MEMORIAM

Richard J. Feeney, Dorchester, MA
(USMC on Taiwan)

Ritchie Feeney, a friend of 2/71 Artillery (Taiwan) Association, passed away on 16 July 2003. Why should we be interested in the passing of a marine who served on Taiwan in 1958? He was a Corporal serving in Ping-Tung with the U.S. Marines on the south end of the island while we served in the northern part of Taiwan.

Ritchie was instrumental in members of our Association receiving the 823 Campaign Badge of Honor from the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1998. In late 1997, he read that the Taiwan government was planning to honor the 23 August 1958 defenders of Quemoy and Matsu with a medal on the 40th anniversary of that courageous defense. Ritchie contacted the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Boston and asked that Americans, who served on Taiwan at that time, be awarded the same medal as the ROC military. This was picked up by a Boston newspaper and was read by Dave O'Connell. Dave passed this on to Bob Mackintosh and for the next six to eight months, Dave, Bob, and Ritchie were in constant communication. Ritchie added the 2/71's requirement for the 823 Badge of Honor and increased his original request for fifty medals to 250. The Boston TECO had to coordinate the request with their Washington office and the ROC Ministry of Defense. This was a slow process, but Ritchie was always optimistic and dogged in his determination that this was something that the ROC government must do. He was not always tactful as he pushed the Boston TECO office almost daily.

As a result, all of our members who attended the reunion in El Paso in September 1998 were awarded the medal by the Taiwan representative from the Dallas Office. Those not attending the reunion, and desiring the medal, received the medal by mail.

From: Paul Feeney - Richie's Brother
To all who served in Taiwan:

My brother Richie passed away. I was the last to be with him. It was Tuesday evening, July 15 and his birthday was

the next day, July 16. He was very excited and very, very happy. In fact, I was really glad to see him so happy. He told me that I was his favorite brother and that he loved me very much. At the time of my visit, he was on the computer responding to the over 50 Taiwan vets from around the country who had taken the time to e-mail him their birthday greetings. Richie was in his glory and he was taking the time to respond in a personal and full and complete way to every e-mailer. I've witnessed Richie's goal to get the Taiwan vets recognized from the day he started. No one knows more about this effort on his part than I do. His work in this field just pointed out to me what I already knew about my brother Richie and that is that the things he got involved with were never about personal gain. Everything he's ever done in his life was important to those whose lives his actions a it affected. He was an involved veteran active in the DAV and the US Marine Corps Auxiliary. He founded the Dorchester Sunday Softball League over 30 years ago and it continues to this day. He was a great fan of my weekly newspaper, BOSTON CITY PAPER and in an effort to please him and all the Taiwan vets, we published the 2003 Veterans Day Edition as a special tribute to the Taiwan Vets. In it, we recalled the history of the Taiwan Crisis and we published all stories received from around the country from Taiwan Vets. This made both Richie and myself extremely proud that we had taken the time to inform our readers about the tension and lingering threat of Communist China over the Republic of Taiwan. We know the ultimate outcome and the long range economic success story of Taiwan - made possible by America's willingness to stand up to Communist China and put the lives of our servicemen on the line. We pray that this commitment to Democracy and Freedom will always be the mainstay of American Foreign policy.

Yours truly,
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2nd Missile Battalion Background Information

The following paper was prepared by **Bob Mackintosh** to support the recommendation that 2/71 be awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation Medal for its service on Taiwan, 1958 – 1959. Thought that you might be interested in some of the background information about the situation in 1958 and the subsequent deployment of the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery and the supporting units.. The original package included the references cited in the paper. They are omitted in the newsletter.

**2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association
271 Shady Oak Drive, New Market, AL 35761
30 January 2003**

The attached comments on the US Army 2nd Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules), 71st Artillery are based on my recollections as a Fire Control Platoon Leader and a Launcher Platoon Leader in both B Battery and C Battery, 2/71, during the battalion's deployment to Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC) from September 1958 to August 1959. Also included are excerpts from my research of documents concerning the situation in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, as they applied to the 2nd Missile Battalion, or to the general situation affecting the battalion. The documents with classification markings were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and were declassified prior to release.

While most of my comments and documentation refer to the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (2/71), they also apply, for the most part, to the 2nd Missile Battalion's support units. They were the 178th Ordnance Detachment (Missile Maintenance), the 1st Signal Detachment (Maintenance), the 31st Engineer Detachment (Field Maintenance), the 554th Ordnance Company (Direct Automotive Support), and a contingent of Signal Augmentation troops.

During the deployment of 2/71 to Taiwan, I was a First Lieutenant, US Army Ordnance Corps, on a two-year detail to the Air Defense Artillery Branch.

Robert H. Mackintosh
President
2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association

Facts Concerning the Deployment of the US Army 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Nike-Hercules) to Taiwan in 1958

The Nuclear Threat in 1958

The nuclear threat in 1958 was a real and present danger. As air defense officers we were taught to deploy nuclear (then called atomic) weapons, we knew how to protect ourselves and our troops from nuclear fallout, determine possible casualties from nuclear fallout, and how to select minimum burst altitudes to avoid a ground burst, or contact of the fireball with the ground. The Nike-Hercules air defense system was the only Army air defense system that had a nuclear capability. It could carry a 1000-pound warhead, high-explosive or nuclear. We did not have nuclear warheads on Taiwan because there were no other Army security forces on Taiwan to protect those assets; however, they were within airlift range of our units, if that became necessary. US Army field artillery units in 1958 had nuclear warheads for the 8-inch howitzer, 120 mm gun, Corporal missile system, and the Honest John rocket. None of these were deployed to Taiwan. The Nike-Hercules missile system also had a ground-to-ground capability that could have been used to deploy nuclear weapons in a field artillery role.

The following references show the National thinking in 1958 regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Straits/China situation:

Reference 1: *Memorandum for Mr. Herter August 14 Discussion of Taiwan Straits* by Gerard C. Smith to Secretary of State, 13 August 1958

1. *It is our understanding that current JCS war plans call for defense of Quemoy and Matsu by nuclear strikes deep into Communist China, including military targets in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Nanking and Canton complexes where population density is extremely high.*
3. *While nuclear strikes would be with low yield weapons, this would include weapons having a yield comparable to 20KT weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.*
5. *The President recently directed the preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate on Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to US Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East (Tab C). It was concluded that if our present military planning was carried out Peiping and its Soviet ally would probably feel compelled to react with nuclear attacks at least on Taiwan and on the Seventh Fleet. Under our present strategic concept, this would be the signal for general nuclear war between the US and the USSR.*

Reference 2: Commander US Taiwan Defense Command/ Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan to CINCPACIFIC, 15 December 1958 *Review of actions taken during Taiwan emergency of August/November 1958*

Consequently, successful cold war and limited war operations require a flexible posture in which the US can exploit its capability to concentrate mobile forces quickly. It is axiomatic that a flexible posture requires that we not exclude

US atomic weapons capability from our assumptions. In deterring the CHICOMs from aggression, the threat of atomic counter-action is as important as the threat of US intervention. Signed: R.W. Smoot (Admiral)

Reference 3: *JCS to CINCPAC, Commander Taiwan Defense Command (US) Taiwan, 25 August 1958*

f. In event major attack seriously endangers the principal offshore islands, prepare to assist ChiNats, including attack against coastal air bases. It is probable that initially only conventional weapons will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons.

Reference 4: *Inclosure 1. COMUSTDC/MASG Taiwan Report of Taiwan-Kinmen Operations Aug-Dec. 1958*

5d....It is considered of urgent importance that all US echelons, military and civil, be fully apprised of the extent to which US forces (and the US contribution to contingent combined operations) have come to rely on the availability of atomic weapons. It is vital that (1) action be initiated to make the use of efficient atomic weapons acceptable to US allies in particular and to the world in general, and (2) aggressive and imaginative actions be taken to maximize, technically and tactically, our non-atomic capabilities.

Other Pertinent CHICOM Activity.

(4) 23 August – 5 September...Beginning 31 August the Soviets expressed strong support of Communist China, warning that any threat to that country is a threat to Soviet Russia.

(6) 15 September – 24 September...On 19 September Krushchev stated that if Communist China were attacked with nuclear weapons the aggressor will be rebuffed at once by the same means. Peiping consistently stated that a ceasefire was unacceptable and only a US withdrawal from the Taiwan area could ease the tension.

Reference 5: *FAS Military Analysis Network Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands 23 August 1958 – 01 January 1959 http://fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/quemoy_matsu.htm*

Subsequently Eisenhower provided the Nationalists with air-to-air missiles that enabled them to sweep Mao's MIGs from the skies over the Taiwan Strait, and sent to Quemoy and Matsu 8-inch howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells, and the 1957 agreement....placed Matador missiles on Taiwan. These surface to-to-surface weapons were capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads up to 600 miles.

In his memoirs Krushchev states that he was in favor of liquidating the islands in preparation for an attack on Taiwan itself.

In a letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Krushchev wrote that an American attack on China would be viewed as an attack on the USSR.

The Air Defense Situation on Taiwan in 1958

The Nationalist Chinese Forces, Republic of China (ROC), in 1958 had no Army air defense missile systems.

The ROC Army had some air defense guns, but the primary air defense of the island was provided by the ROC Air Force using American provided F-80s and F-86s with American trained pilots. In the summer of 1958, when the air situation over the Taiwan Straits worsened, the US equipped and trained the ROC Air Force to use the Sidewinder missile system on the ROC aircraft. They were used successfully against Soviet MIG 15s and 17s flown by Communist Chinese pilots. Most of the air activity in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 involved fighter aircraft.

There was much talk of the Communist Chinese invading the island of Taiwan. The air power to support this capability was provided by Soviet built, PRC operated bombers. At that time the Communist Chinese had the twin-engine Ilyushin IL-28 Beagle tactical bomber and the Soviets had the Tupolev Tu-16 Badger, twin-jet, medium bomber, and the TU-20 Bear, four-turboprop bomber. (*Jane's All the World Aircraft 1959-1960*). (There were no ICBMs at that time as the first satellite was deployed by the Soviets in 1957.)

Before the 2nd Missile Battalion was deployed and operational on Taiwan the Communist Chinese Air Force used to test the air defenses of Taipei by sending Soviet-built bombers from one of the mainland airbases, across the Taiwan Straits, on a direct line to Taipei. The ROC would scramble their F-80s, or F-86s, to intercept the Chinese Communist Aircraft. We found out later that if the Communist aircraft were able to get back across an imaginary line (Davis Line), mid-way across the Taiwan Strait, before the ROC aircraft could engage them, then there would be no intercept of the enemy aircraft. This gentleman's agreement was not passed on to the Nike-Hercules battalion when it became operational on Taiwan. In late October 1958, and on the first night that Bravo Battery was operational, a twin-engine, Soviet-built IL-28 (the only twin-engine attack bomber they were using at that time) took off from a coastal airstrip and headed for Taipei. The battery had been on 3-minute alert and was required to engage any target in three minutes. (One battery was always on 3-minute alert, one on 30-minute alert, one on 3-hour alert, and one was down for maintenance, if the equipment was operational.) The Rules of Engagement were to fire on any aircraft that did not give the proper IFF response. The lines of communication to the battalion air defense command post (AADCP) and the Air Force Command and Control Center were very primitive. The battery-to-battalion communications link was a Spiral-4 field wire, with field radio backup. (The details of the Communist aircraft penetration attempt that night are in Reference 6, *Air Defense Magazine*, September-October 1998, *Operation Hurry Up!*.)

The response of the Nike-Hercules battalion that night changed the dynamics of the air defense of Taipei from that day forward. Neither the US Air Force Command and Control Center on Taiwan, nor the Communist Chinese Air Force had anticipated that the unit could identify an enemy target and be locked on, ready to fire, before the first tactical

aircraft could be scrambled and off the runway to engage the target. The intercept of the Communist Chinese attack bomber by the Nike-Hercules battalion was finally halted a few seconds before launch by the US Air Force Command and Control Center via the telephone link to the battalion AADCP, and then to the battery. The Rules of Engagement were changed the next day, to require a release from the Air Force before a missile could be fired. The Communist Chinese Air Force also changed their procedures and did not try to penetrate the Nike-Hercules defense of Taipei and Northern Taiwan.

It should be noted the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Nike-Hercules) was the only tactical US Army unit on Taiwan, with the exception of the headquarters unit, Hq USA Forces of the US Taiwan Defense Command. (See Reference 7, *United States Army, Pacific, Station List, as of 31 December 1958*)

The Rapid Deployment of 2nd Missile Bn, 71st Artillery

BG Lester Bork, Chief, Army MAAG on Taiwan, requested US Army (air defense) missile support from the Secretary of the Army, Wilber M. Brucker, on 23 August 1958. (See Reference 8, Information furnished by BG Bork, USA-Retired, to the Atlanta Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in November 2001.)

On Aug 23rd they fired 58,750 artillery rounds on us. I cabled the US Army Scty. (Secretary) for permission to respond. He approved and immediately ordered a missile battalion to Taiwan to help me.

JCS notified USARPAC that a Nike-Hercules battalion was going to be deployed to the Theater on 25 August 1958 (See Reference 9, *Message CINCPAC to JCS 25 August 1958*)

The 2nd Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules) was activated by DA General Order 28 on 28 August 1958 (See Reference 10, *Unit History, Battery B, 2d Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules) 71st Artillery, APO 63*), at the height of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958. The nucleus of the new unit was a Nike-Hercules package that was undergoing transition training at Ft. Bliss, Texas on the Nike-Hercules missile system. They had all been trained on the Nike-Ajax missile system earlier, and most had seen duty on Nike-Ajax sites in CONUS. Personnel to man the remaining slots in the new battalion came from the 495th Nike-Ajax battalion that was supporting the US Army Air Defense School at Ft. Bliss, Texas.

USARPAC was notified 28 August 1958 of the unit's deployment to Taiwan. (See Reference 9, *CINCPAC to JCS, 28 August 1958*.)

C. CINCPAC concurs in and welcomes augmentations of Nike Hercules Bn and Essex TG already directed.

Department of Army notified the USA Air Defense Center, 29 August 1958, and Movement Orders were cut on

3 September 1958 (See Reference 11, *Movement Orders 18, Hqs US Army Air Defense Center, Fort Bliss, Texas*)

*2.the following described unit will move from Ft. Bliss, Texas, to the United States Army Transportation Terminal Agency Seattle, Washington, and thence to overseas destination:
6891-A 2nd Msl Bn, (Nike Hercules), 71st Artillery...*

The unit moved by rail from El Paso, Texas on 15 September 1958 to Seattle, Washington. On 23 September the unit, less an advanced party and support units, sailed on the MSTs ship, General J.C. Breckenridge, for Taiwan. The equipment for the missile system was transported separately by ship to Taiwan. The Breckenridge docked at Keelung, Taiwan, on 8 October 1958 to off-load the troops of the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery.

While the unit was being transported to Taiwan, action had been taken to have two American construction companies and Engineer units of the Republic of China (ROC) initiate the preparation of four tactical missile sites West of Taipei in Northern Taiwan. When the unit arrived in country, a ROC Army facility had been turned over to the Americans for use by the 2/71 Battalion Headquarters, and the construction engineers had started to level tea fields for the firing batteries on the mountain tops west of Taipei.

The firing batteries started moving troops and equipment (that had arrived at the port of Keelung before the troops arrived) to the battery sites. Squad tents were erected for battery administration and troop housing. The fire control trailers were positioned and launcher equipment was located near the concrete hard stand that was being prepared for the missile launchers.

On 26 October 1958, (See Reference 10) the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery was operational and providing Northern Taiwan with Nike-Hercules protection against the Communist Chinese air threat.

Thus, in less than 60 days, the 2nd Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules), 71st Artillery was activated by DA General Order, was integrated into a battalion-size unit of 700 men from two existing units, was transported by train and ship to Taiwan, and with the help of its technical support units, assumed a tactical air defense mission in a hostile environment.

The US Air Defense Mission on Taiwan

The ROC Air Force in August 1958 was under extreme pressure to engage the Communist Air Force in the Defense of the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu, and to simultaneously defend the air space of Taiwan. The US Air Force was concurrently training the ROC Air Force to use the newly introduced Sidewinder missile as armament on the ROC aircraft. This so heavily taxed the resources of the ROC Air Force that they agreed US Forces could take over the responsibility for air defense of Taiwan. This is shown in References 3 and 4. Also shown is the buildup of enemy aircraft on the mainland airfields across the Taiwan Strait.

(Reference 3)

1. *In anticipation of continued ChiCom action against the off-shore islands, the following actions are directed:*

Reinforce US air defense forces on Taiwan from PaCom sources,Prepare to assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan, using US forces to extent practicable.

3. *The following actions are being taken:*

b. Department of Defense has authorized restoration of NIKE battalion to FY 59 MAP for expeditious dispatch to Taiwan. This unit will be originally manned by US personnel and progressively turned over to the ChiNats. It will start in one month and be operational in two months.

(Reference 4)

1.h. On 18 September COMUSTDC/MMAG Taiwan requested from MND authority to take over the responsibility of air defense of Taiwan to permit the CAF to concentrate on combat operations and advanced training in new equipment. MND agreed to this plan on 24 September and the US took over this responsibility utilizing both US and GRC resources...COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan...is in the process of passing air defense responsibilities back to the GRC.

2.o.(4) Air Force...However, even with this record, one major deficiency remains in the CAF. It still has no effective night or all weather capability and must depend on the US to provide air defense during periods of low visibility.

7. Intelligence Summary and Estimate of Future CHICOM Courses of Action.

(a). CHICOM buildup prior to 23 August.

(1) On 1 August GRC photo reconnaissance revealed MIG 15/17 jet fighters stationed at previously unoccupied coastal airfields at Cheng Hai near Swatow. Throughout the month additional airfields were occupied until by early September all but Hui An were known to carry jet fighters. At this time about 220 MID 15/17 fighters were known to be on the coastal airfields.

Air Defense of Taipei and Northern Taiwan

The 2nd Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules), 71st Artillery played a significant role in the air defense to Taipei and Northern Taiwan in the fall of 1958. Their 24-hour, all-weather, air defense of the Northern end of Taiwan enabled the US Air Force to concentrate their efforts on the Southern portion of the island and their mission of training the ROC Air Force in the use of the Sidewinder missile system. The ROC Air Force was heavily engaged in defending the ROC forces on Quemoy and Matsu from the Communist tactical aircraft threat. The aircraft of the US Navy's 7th Fleet were heavily engaged in protecting the fleet and the naval resupply vessels attempting to run the Communist blockade of the off-shore islands, Quemoy and Matsu.

The 2nd Missile Battalion was the only US Army air defense unit on Taiwan, and the only tactical US Army unit deployed on Taiwan. (See Reference 7)

The unit had four firing batteries which were self

sufficient, but integrated into the overall air defense plan. They were deployed in a line from the northwest corner of Taiwan to a point approximately 40 miles southwest of Taipei. Each battery had a fire control element consisting of a long-range acquisition radar, a Target Tracking Radar, a Missile Tracking Radar, and a fire control center called the Integrated Command and Control Center. Each battery had a launcher platoon consisting of a Launch Control Console, and three launcher sections of four missiles each. These missiles provided coverage of the Taiwan Strait from the mainland of China up to an altitude of 75,000 feet with their 1000-pound, high-explosive warheads. The battalion headquarters provided additional surveillance radars, and an Army Air Defense Command Post (AADCP) that was tied to the Air Force Command and Control Center.

Internal Security

Taiwan was in a high state of alert. The ROC Army was training to repel a possible invasion, and manned concrete bunkers with machine guns were evident throughout the area. This sense of possible invasion was widely held by the US at that time. (See Reference 12. *Article 8 of 8. Bomber Series—Martin B-57 Canberra, Message from J.F. Baugher, 27 January 1997,*

Message ID: <“ E4oHjl.CqC@ranger.caytonoh.ncr.com>

The deactivation of the 345th BG was further delayed by a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. In August of 1958, Mainland Chinese forces began bombarding the Nationalist-held island of Quemoy. Late in August, the 345th BG sent a detachment of B-57s to Okinawa to stay on alert just in case mainland forces tried to invade Taiwan. The 3rd BG stood by in Japan to strike strategic targets in China, North Korea and possibly even the Soviet Union should the crisis escalate out of control.

The threat of commando type operations against the new missile battalion was a distinct possibility. When first deployed, each firing battery provided its own internal security. This included security of the equipment and supplies from theft, to tactical security of the physically separated fire control and launcher areas. (The battery administrative area was located near the fire control or the launcher area. This varied in each battery.) The batteries had to establish a perimeter defense with unit personnel armed with rifles, 50 cal. machineguns and bazookas. This required a demanding schedule of 24 hours on the air defense mission, and the next 24 hours on the physical security mission. The batteries had access to some barbed wire; but there were no chain-link fences available to help protect the area, as were standard on stateside air defense missile sites. At night the unit operated under blackout conditions.

Later in the deployment, the Nationalist Chinese (ROC) Army assisted with the physical security mission. This improved the security, but it did not relieve the troops on guard duty very much, as they still had to have an American soldier with the Chinese guards, as none of them spoke

English. After three or four months, Cyclone fencing was installed and the troops were able to return to a more normal schedule that included guard duty on the entry points to each area.

Training of ROC Soldiers to Operate Nike-Hercules Missile System

The 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery was tasked to train two operating crews at each battery site from January 1959 to August 1959. (See Reference 13, Hqs, 2nd Missile Battalion (NIKE-HERCULES), 71st Artillery, APO 63, US Army Forces, 16 January 1959 to All Members, 2^d Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery, APO 63 *Letter of Appreciation*, by Battalion Commander, LTC Bernard I. Greenberg.)

We will shortly embark on a program of on-the-job training of Chinese personnel, who in the near future will replace US personnel at all of our battery sites. This training program, combined with our existing tactical and internal security mission, will continue to be demanding.

These were non-English speaking troops with a high school education. A third crew for each battery, the officers, and the maintenance personnel were trained in CONUS.

The on-site training by members of 2/71 initially was performed with the help of Chinese interpreters while the unit was performing its operational mission. This required extraordinary effort on the part of the men of 2/71, as equipment checks and maintenance had to be performed before the training of the Chinese Nationals (now called Taiwanese) could start, and the instructors had to prepare for their training when they would normally be off duty. Not too long after the training cycle started, much of the training was accomplished by the 2/71 instructors without the help of the interpreters. Our troops were so competent that they quickly picked up a small Chinese vocabulary to conduct the training without the help of the interpreters, except in those cases where an explanation was required. This training included all of the operator duties necessary to operate the highly sophisticated weapon system and perform daily operator checks and adjustments. It was quite a feat that the men of 2/71 were able to train foreign nationals, with no prior technical experience, to operate such a complicated weapon system that included three different radars, an Integrated Command and Control Center, the assembly and checkout of a complicated missile guidance package and warhead into a missile/booster assembly, and the maintenance of the hydraulic missile launcher system. The 2/71 troops also trained the Chinese in the operation of all ancillary equipment in the missile battery such as radios, switchboards, generators, and materials handling equipment.

In seven months time, mid-January to mid-August 1959, the Chinese troops were trained by the troops of 2/71 to operate all of the equipment in the battalion with such proficiency that the Chinese 1st Missile Battalion was certified to be competent to take over operational control of the battalion equipment on 15 August 1959. Just prior to that date the contingent of officers and men who had been

training in the US returned and were integrated into the unit.

The 2nd Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules) was inactivated on 15 August 1959. (See Reference 14, *Army Lineage Series, Air Defense Artillery*, Compiled by Janice E. McKenney, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C. 1985)

One officer, two Warrant Offices, and a very few NCOs from each battery remained with the MAAG to be advisors to the 1st Missile Battalion, ROC. Similarly, a few officers and NCOs of 2/71's battalion headquarters remained as missile advisors for the MAAG.

Personnel

The officers, NCOs and enlisted men of the 2nd Missile Battalion were exceptional. They were wholly responsible for the successful completion of an extraordinary mission on Taiwan. While the unit was created from two existing units, both units had very experienced missilemen. The troops who had just completed the Nike-Hercules package training at Fort Bliss, Texas, had recently been on-site with Nike-Ajax units defending cities in CONUS. The battery commanders had previous experience as battery commanders. The unit had trained successfully as a Nike-Hercules unit and was scheduled to be deployed to Alaska to provide a missile air defense on one of the air corridors into the US that was threatened by Soviet bombers.

The men from the 495th AAA Missile Battalion (Nike-Ajax) were highly trained missile men who were providing support to the US Army Air Defense School, and the US Army Air Defense Board. Each battery of the 495th had multiple missions. Two batteries usually supported the Air Defense School for the training of Nike-Ajax operators, while the other two batteries supported the US Army Air Defense Board during testing of Army air defense missile system tactics and procedures. These included live firings at White Sands Proving Ground, NM and static equipment tests during atomic detonations in Nevada. The 495th also had a strategic mission as the only mobile Nike-Ajax missile unit in the US Army. As such, they trained to deploy anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. They trained in the desert to move and shoot under all conditions, including blackout conditions. This experience proved invaluable when the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery deployed to Taiwan. While the Nike-Hercules was a much bigger missile, the radars, fire control system, and launcher equipment were almost identical physically. The upgrade from the Nike-Ajax was mostly a capability upgrade. With the exception a much larger missile and launcher, the configuration of the Nike-Hercules system was almost identical to the Nike-Ajax.

The men of the 2nd Missile Battalion were highly motivated to succeed. In B Battery, for example, there were senior maintenance technicians who volunteered to deploy as operators with the 2nd Missile Battalion. The unit was overgrade in many technical positions, but it provided a highly responsive, highly capable unit. These senior maintenance men volunteered to rotate between the mainte-

nance and operator positions so each of them could maintain their technical proficiency. I know of several times when the battery could have been called out of action during a three-minute alert. But the operator/maintenance-trained men knew exactly what to do and how many minutes it would take to correct the situation and bring the equipment back to an operational status. This was usually done in less than a minute, in situations that would normally have taken 10 to 15 minutes to get a maintenance man to correct the problem.

Most of the officers had extensive experience. There were only two 2nd Lieutenants in the battalion when we deployed. Several of the Lieutenants, who served as platoon leaders or Executive officers, had stateside experience as battery commanders. The Warrant Officers and NCOs were similarly experienced, motivated, and technically proficient.

The Enlisted men in the 2nd Missile Battalion were a mixture of Regular Army and draftees. The Regular Army enlisted members of the unit brought experience to the unit while the draftees, who had been selected for missile training because of their technical ability, brought highly intelligent men who were challenged by the technical complexity of the Nike-Hercules system and the adventure of serving in a foreign country. Our recent 2/71 Reunions have shown that many of them were discharged, completed their schooling and became doctors, lawyers, airline pilots, engineers, company presidents, insurance salesmen, farmers, and more. They were exceptional contributors to the success of our multiple missions on Taiwan.

The experience and dedication of the men of the 2nd Missile Battalion permitted them to perform several concurrent missions while having to perform under the most severe physical and operational conditions.

Physical Conditions for the 2/71 Nike-Hercules Battalion on Taiwan

The physical conditions on Taiwan provided an extraordinary environment for both men and equipment. The men had many nice days, but many more were cold, wet, hot and dusty. The mountain top locations of the firing batteries were selected for their radar coverage of the Taiwan Straits. These sites on mountainsides that had previously been tea fields, were seas of mud during the rainy season. The elevation put the batteries in rain clouds much of the winter with the wind driving rain into the equipment, the tents and the men. The temperatures never reached freezing, but it was impossible to stay warm or to dry out in the wind-driven rains.

The summers were hot, but the biggest challenge to men and equipment was the typhoon. Most missile sites in the US and overseas had some sort of permanent shelter for the men and missile equipment. On Taiwan, there were only temporary shelters for the men and they had to perform exceptionally well to lash down the radars, launchers, and missiles to prevent loss of the equipment in the typhoon.

The weather conditions placed an unusually high maintenance workload on the men to keep the missile equipment operational.

Operational Conditions for the 2/71 Nike-Hercules Battalion on Taiwan

The officers of the 2/71 had a much higher workload than other missile units in CONUS or those deployed overseas. Since the 2/71 was a separate battalion, there were no other air defense assets deployed to Taiwan. In the haste of deploying the unit to Taiwan, there was no provision, made to staff the battalion Army Air Defense Command Post (AADCP) for around-the clock manning. This was a function normally provided by a higher headquarters. To staff the AADCP, the battalion headquarters took two officers from each firing battery. The firing batteries had a Fire Control Platoon and a Launcher Platoon, each with a Platoon Leader and an Assistant Platoon Leader to support 24/7 operations. One of the officers from each platoon was detailed to serve in the battalion AADCP, leaving each battery platoon at one-half its authorized officer strength. As mentioned previously, the four firing batteries had to maintain one battery on three-minute alert status, one on 30-minute alert status, one on 3-hour alert status, one in a three-day standby maintenance status. On top of this workload, the on-site training of ROC missile crewmen started in mid-January 1959 and continued through 15 August 1959.

As mentioned earlier, the demanding alert status, along with the physical security mission without adequate perimeter fencing, put a very heavy workload on the enlisted members of the 2nd Missile Battalion. They pulled 24 hours on missile operation duty, then 24 hours on guard duty. During the daytime portion of the 24 hours of missile operation, the troops performed equipment checks, performed air defense drills, searched the skies for hostile aircraft, and trained ROC missile operators (January-August 1959 only). At night, the men maintained minimum crews at the duty stations, while the remaining crewmembers rested on the floor of equipment vans, or in adjacent ready tents. The guard duty portion of their schedule was a normal guard tour of four hours on and four hours off.

The logistical supply lines to support the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery were exceptionally strained. The 2/71 was the only Nike-Hercules missile system deployed outside the CONUS in 1958. The rapid deployment of the unit to Taiwan was not accompanied by a corresponding realignment of the missile lines of supply. Technical support units of Ordnance, Signal, and Engineers were sent to Taiwan to provide 3rd echelon maintenance support, but these units also had problems with the missile peculiar, technical supply lines. At that time, there were no Nike-Hercules repair parts in the Pacific Theater (USARPAC), except those that were shipped with the 2nd Missile Battalion and its assigned support units. The problem was exacerbated on Taiwan since all requisitions for the Army missile parts had to go through the US Air Force Supply System to Army CONUS depots. At that time, there was no compatibility between the Air Force and the Army supply systems. This contributed to the technical supply problem. The men of 2/71 often relied on friends at the Army Air Defense School at

Ft. Bliss, Texas to provide small repair parts by mail to keep the missile equipment operational.

Non-technical, logistical support on Taiwan was outstanding. The Navy provided meats, dry and canned goods, while each battery of 2/71 was authorized to buy produce, bread, and milk on the local economy.

Our Taiwan Hosts

The government, the military, and the people of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan had great respect for the job that the Americans, and the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery in particular, did in protecting their homeland from the Communist Threat in 1958. The men and missile equipment of the battalion were visible proof that the United States was committed to protecting Taiwan from the imminent Communist Chinese threat. The US Air Force and the US Navy were there in greater numbers, but they were not as visible to the general population as the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery. In addition the ROC Army held the men of 2/71 in even greater esteem because they were their teachers. In the Chinese culture, the teachers were most highly respected and revered.

The following letters reflect some of that appreciation:

Reference 15: Letter from Chang Tao-fan, President (ROC) and Representatives of the Legislative Yuan, 10 October 1958, *A Message to Officers And Men Of The Armed Forces Of The United States Undertaking Joint Defense Duties In The Taiwan and Penghu Area*

...The United States is our staunch ally and has backed us up with positive aids to repulse the unprovoked attack...

To accomplish this sacred mission, you have come from afar to assume the joint defense duties with our armed forces to stem the evil tide of Communism.

Reference 16: Control Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan, October 27, 1958 *To The Officers and Men of the US Armed Forces in Taiwan*

On behalf of the parliamentary Control Yuan of the Republic of China, we the representatives of the Yuan, wish to welcome you most cordially, and extend to you our sincere appreciation and admiration of your determined efforts against Communist aggression.

...Both the Communists and Soviet Russia have more than once revealed their ambition of conquering Taiwan and driving you off the Taiwan Strait and Western Pacific.

Reference 17: *A Message to the US Armed Forces in China from The National Assembly of the Republic of China*, 22 November 1958

...In view of the great farsightedness and friendly helpfulness of your nation in our common struggle, the National Assembly of the Republic of China, ... desires to convey to you its profound respects by presenting you this souvenir as an expression of their admiration and gratitude.

Reference 18: *E-mail from Commander, Air Defense Missile Command (ROC), 19 April 200*

We are deeply obliged to you as well as your country for your monumental dedications to the armament of our missile troops during the joint cross-strait defense of R.O.C. and U.S.A., so that our country could still attain full growth, even (when) confronted with the threat of China.

Reference 19: Republic of China Air Defense Missile Command Briefing 26 April 2001 to 2-71 Missile Battalion Veterans, *Former Nike-Hercules Veterans' Visit Briefing*

2. Conclusion

After the historical details and our videotape, we can deeply feel and appreciate your greatness. Were it not for your pioneering efforts and marvelous diligence, our air defense combat capabilities wouldn't be growing and getting strong.

Success of the Nike-Hercules Mission

The deployment of the 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery to the Taiwan Straits in September 1958 played a small, but very important, part in the success of the United States' policy to deter aggression by the Communist Chinese. Ambassador Drumright expressed the success of the overall strategy: (See Reference 4: AmEmbassy, Taiwan to The Department of State, Washington, 31 December 1958 *Transmitting Report of Kinmen Operations*)

Our firm policy and generous support of the GRC in August and September 1958 paid off handsomely in stopping the Communists and in raising our stock among the other powers of Asia. In my opinion, the next attack must be met as resolutely as the last one. Signed: Everett F. Drumright

The 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery was sent to Taiwan to help provide an air defense for that country, but in doing its mission it became a showpiece of the United States' resolve to support Taiwan in its fight against Communist Chinese aggression. This was most evident in the newspapers of the day, in the United States and in Taiwan. (See Reference 20: *Selected Newspaper clippings from September 1958 to August 1959*) The unit was frequently shown in the China Post with visitors from US Congressional delegations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, President Chiang Kai Shek, and other dignitaries from the US and Taiwan.

The overall success of the 2nd Missile Battalion can best be summarized by four messages. One from LTC Greenberg, battalion commander of 2/71 on Taiwan in 1958; one from Father John Dahlheimer, an American, Jesuit priest serving on Taiwan in 1958; one from Major General Cavin, Commanding General of the US Army Air Defense Center and School in 1998; and one by Walter C. Lapsley, a radar technician who served with the 2nd Missile Battalion in 1958, as he reflected back on the mission in 2002.

Reference 13: Hqs, 2nd Missile Battalion (NIKE-HERCULES), 71st Artillery, APO 63, US Army Forces, 16 January 1959 to All Members, 2^d Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery, APO 63 *Letter of Appreciation* from LTC Bernard I. Greenberg.

You, individually and collectively, proved that an organization such as ours could be quickly formulated and deployed to an area threatened by Communist aggression. You further proved our nations capability to respond rapidly to our allies needs for military assistance.

Your selfless devotion to duty enabled this organization to become quickly operational in the air defense of Taipei, Taiwan, and to continue a readiness status envied by many.

Reference 21: Christmas Letter of Father John J. Dahlheimer, S.J., Chaplain of the Matsu Complex, China, Christmas-New Year 1959.

...the 2nd Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules) of the 71st Artillery – God Bless ‘em! During their tour of duty here, I was privileged to be the chaplain first of Delta Battery, which was closest to Hsinchu, and eventually to all of the batteries.

...but I have a very delicious feeling that thanks to all this extremely impressive hardware off-loaded so swiftly and with little attempt at secrecy here in Taiwan when it was most needed, i.e. the Nike missiles, the F10 Starfighters, and the Marines, ...

Not a missile had to be fired and none of the US aircraft deployed had to tangle seriously with any unfriendly; not a single American life was lost in action against the enemy. It is clear now if it wasn't before: if we are willing to put up, the Communist can do nothing but shut up. Thanks to the men who lived here from September-October to August in the mud, and the cold, and the dust, the free world has one of the most important – and least expensive – victories since the heartbreak of Korea. Taiwan, 1958-1959, was a real victory, for a very real and a very deadly battle was fought...

This Christmas, God so willing, if there is some sort of peace on earth even though all men are not of good will, give a little thought and prayer of thanks to the men who spent last Christmas here in Taiwan making this year's Christmas possible. With the turnover of the missiles to the First Missile Battalion of the Chinese Army, the 2nd Missile Battalion of the 71st Artillery, USA, fades into history. It was created precisely for the situation in Taiwan and today no longer exists. It did its work well, just how well, only history will prove. I was proud and privileged to be of some little service to the men who were protecting the two countries I love, the United States and China. And just as I began this little story of missile men (the Twentieth Century's equivalent of the MinuteMen), so let me conclude it: God bless ‘em and thank God they came when we needed them! We in Taiwan are grateful.

Reference 22: Letter of Appreciation from Major General Dennis D. Cavin, Commanding General USA Air Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss, 8 September 1998, to 2d Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery

The Nike Hercules systems that soldiers of the 2d Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery crewed are museum artifacts, but the Battalion's legacy endures. Your Battalion's 1958 headline-making deployment to Taiwan at the height of the Cold War served as the prototype for the crisis deployments of Patriot air and missile defense systems that make headlines

today. Soldiers of the 2d Missile Battalion, individually and collectively, proved air defense missile units can quickly deploy and rapidly become operational in crisis situations.

We will continue to field increasingly sophisticated air and missile defense systems as we move forward into the 21st Century, but we will not recast the mold that produced the soldiers of the 2d Missile Battalion. Rather, we will strive to produce soldiers whose expertise, competence and selfless devotion to duty merit comparison to the high standards you set four decades ago at a moment of crisis.

(Hand written)We are all very proud of your contribution to our branch, our Army and the nation.

HOOAH!!

Reference 23: E-mail, 10/22/02, from D Battery 2/71 member (SP4) Walter C. Lapsley

Many of us were too young and naive to realize the significance of our act. We faced an unknown fate against a known foe, in a pivotal time, with positive results. With few exceptions I can't think of many military events over the period of my life where we met a specific direct military threat for a specific period of time, leaving the tools and knowledge for the people to protect themselves. I guess that this approach does perhaps personify the Cold War period. We came, we saw, we helped and got out with honor and no battle related casualties.

One can wax eloquent about our adventure with a good feeling about what we did for ourselves and our allies.

Regards,


Your comrade,

Chuck Lapsley

A Unique Army unit.

The 2nd Missile Battalion (Nike-Hercules), 71st Artillery is probably the only US Army unit ever to be activated, deployed to a foreign country in a hostile environment, that accomplished its air defense mission and concurrently trained foreign nationals to operate highly technical equipment, with non-English speaking operators, and turned the equipment over to a foreign government – all within a one year period.

The 2nd Missile Battalion's accomplishment of its multiple missions is probably also unique in scope and complexity for any size unit, of any US Department of Defense Military Service, at any time in history.



Plan on attending the next reunion in San Antonio, TX, 7-10 October 2004