



# 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association

271 Shady Oak Drive  
New Market, AL 35761  
<<http://www.2-71adataiwan.com>>



Volume 9

Newsletter 1

April 2005

## Meritorious Unit Citation

Congressman Bob Goodlatte submitted a recommendation to the U.S. Army that 2<sup>nd</sup> Missile Battalion, 71<sup>st</sup> Artillery be awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for service on Taiwan in 1958. The following reply was received by the Congressman:

Jul 29 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Congress of the United States,  
House of Representatives, ATTN: Honorable Bob  
Goodlatte:



SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Meritorious  
Unit Commendation

1. The recommendation for award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 71<sup>st</sup> Artillery, for the period September 1958 to August 1959, received careful and extensive evaluation. Although the unit's accomplishments were certainly noteworthy, the Army Unit Awards Board in conjunction with Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, determined that the recommendation did not meet the strict criteria for the award as outlined in paragraph 7-15 of Army Regulation 600-8-22.

2. This determination in no way detracts from, nor reflects adversely on, the performance of the recommended unit and its contributions to the United States Army.

BY ORDER OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Robert L. White, Jr.  
LTC, AG  
Chief, Military Awards Branch




## In Memoriam

**Donald L. Lane**, (D Btry), El Paso, TX, died 24 Jan 2005. Don was CWO in the Launcher Platoon of D Battery.

**William H. Owens**, (Hq Btry), Colorado Springs, CO died 14 Sep 2003. Captain Owens was the Bn S-2 in 2-71.

**Ronald J. O'Neill**, (D Btry), Port Jefferson Station, NY



## 2006 Reunion

In the last newsletter, we mentioned that Rapid City, SD was selected as the 2006 reunion site at the 2004 General Membership Meeting. Since then, reunion dates have been finalized and the reunion hotel selected. The next reunion will be held 28 September to 1 October, 2006. The reunion hotel will be the Best Western Ramkoda Hotel in Rapid City.

## Obituaries

**CW4, Donald L. Lane**, U.S. Army Ret., loving husband, father, grandfather, brother, and friend passed away January 24, 2005 at the age of 74 years. He was born October 11, 1930 in Voca, Texas to the late Johnnie J. and Zela J. Yarborough Lane. Mr. Lane served his country honorably and faithfully in the United States Army during the Korean

Conflict and Vietnam. Mr. Lane was instrumental in the design and deployment of Nike-Hercules Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, and oversaw deployment of Nike-Hercules sites throughout the cold war in New York, Texas, Taiwan, Alaska, and Florida. CW4 Lane retired in 1972 from the U.S. Army as the Senior Nike-Hercules Instructor at Ft. Bliss, Texas. After his retirement from the military, Mr. Lane concluded his civilian career as Controller for HMO Blue and retired from there in April 1996. After his retirement from HMO Blue, Mr. Lane returned to his roots and enjoyed farming and agriculture and joined his daughter Denisa J. Garcia in a farming venture at their farm in Tornillo. Mr. Lane was a man of great faith, he was kind, patient, joyful and was there for anyone in need. He was an avid fisherman and enjoyed spending time with family and friends on fishing trips. He was preceded in death by his parents; his stepfather, Joe Holiman whom raised him since the age of 14 years after the death of his father, three brothers, Vernon, Johnnie and his twin, Dorman C. Lane. Mr. Lane is survived by his beloved wife of 54 1/2 years, Barbara Lane; his loving children, Donna A. Hourigan and husband, Tim of Las Cruces, Durenda C. Woodruff and Deborah K. Cosgrove of El Paso, Randal S. Lane of Albuquerque, and Denisa J. Garcia of Tornillo; grandchildren, Trevor J. (Darla) and Robert K. Hourigan, C. David III (Erika), Tammy M. and Currisa M. Ruiz, Corey A. Woodruff, A. Brandon and Lauren K. Cosgrove, Jennifer K. (David) and Jonathan P. Lane (Danielle), and Martin E. Garcia; eight great-grandchildren; brother, Otis M. Holiman of Midkiff, Texas. Other survivors include his dear neighbors, Antonio and Erika Lira and his two faithful dogs, Cody and Prissy. Visitation for Mr. Lane will be held on Sunday, January 30, 2005 from 5:00 to 8:30 PM at Martin Funeral Home Central, 3839 Montana Avenue. Funeral Service will be held on Monday, January 31, 2005 at 1:00 PM at Martin Funeral Home Central, with Pastor Chad Kitchens officiating. Concluding services and interment will follow at Ft. Bliss National Cemetery, with full military honors. In lieu of flowers, the family requests that memorials be made on behalf of Mr. Lane to the El Paso Humane Society. Service arrangements have been entrusted to the care of Martin Funeral Home Central.

**William Hayden Owens, Sr.**

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

July 9, 1919 - September 14, 2003

Colonel William (Bill) Owens passed away early on Sunday morning at Sunridge Retirement Community of natural causes.


Col. Owens was born in Columbus, Ohio, to William R. Owens and Catherine E. Williams. He was preceded in death by his parents, his sister Jeanette Hastings and his ex-wife, Mary S. Owens. He is survived by his sons William H. Owens, Jr. of Fountain, CO, Robert W. Owens of Monument, C, Barry D. Owens of Wilmington, NC, his daughter Elisabeth P. Owens of San Francisco, CA, nine grandchildren

and one great grandchild.

Col. Owens interrupted his college days when he entered the Army on July 9th, 1941 during WWII where he served in Europe. He stayed in the army and took part in the Korean Conflict in 1950. During his army career he served at Ft. Stewart, GA, Ft. Bliss, TX, Ft. Hamilton, CA, Ft. Belvoir, VA, and saw duty overseas in Germany, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Col. Owens retired from military service on June 1st, 1970 with the rank of Colonel. Colonel Owens was a proud and loyal army officer and a devoted husband and father.


After retiring from the military, Col. Owens worked as an employment finder and later worked in real estate for a short time.

It was Col. Owens wish to be buried in Wilmington, ND, the home of his ex-wife and mother of his children.



**Membership Renewals**

- Breder, Milt**, Quincy, IL (B Btry)
- Dickerson, Harold**, Quinlan, TX (C Btry)
- Diedrich, Dave**, Athens, WI (D Btry)
- Grant, Sam**, Darlington, SC (Hq Btry)
- Gray, Charles**, Tulsa, OK (1 Sig)
- Henryhand, Henry**, Philadelphia, PA (C Btry)
- Hodge, Nick**, Marianna, AR (C Btry)
- Hurst, Claxton**, Meigs, GA (Aug Gp)
- Jackson, Don**, El Paso, TX (554<sup>th</sup> Ord)
- Kjersgaard, Jim** (Perth Amboy, NJ (D Btry)
- Lefrancois, Leo**, Plainfield, CT (Hq Btry)
- Lisiewski, Al**, Aston, PA (D Btry)
- Morgan, Ron**, Sandpoint, ID (C Btry)
- Nelson, Jim**, Troy, MI (A Btry)
- Olivares, Fidel**, Arlington, TX (Hq Btry)
- Peoples, Jim**, West Trenton, NJ (D Btry)
- Terbille, Herb**, Durham, NC (B Btry)
- Trupp, Vern**, Caldwell, ID (D Btry)
- Weber, Henry**, Santa Teresa, NM (B Btry)



## Notes from the Troops

12/24/04

From: **Ron O'Neill** (D Btry)

Bob and Lois,

Thank you for all your efforts in putting together a wonderful reunion in San Antonio. We had a wonderful time and enjoyed seeing everyone again.

We are looking forward to our 2006 reunion.

Ron and I spend Christmas with our kids and grandkids. We hope you have a very merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

Happy Holidays,

Ron and Nancy O'Neill

1/6/05

From: **Fidel Olivares** (Hq Btry)

Dear Bob,

Here are my dues for 2005.

Sorry I couldn't make the last reunion! Maybe the next one.

I have sent you \$10.00 extra to help with the postage.

Sincerely,

Fidel Olivares

1/8/05

From: **Milt Breder** (B Btry)

Bob,

Here's my check for membership renewal plus a little extra...

Lyla and I certainly enjoyed the San Antonio reunion. We should have spent a couple of more days there.

Hope to see everyone at the next reunion.

Milt Breder

1/8/05

From: **Dave Diedrich** (D Btry)

Good to receive the newsletter and catch up on some of the news I missed out on by not making it to the reunion.

I had head surgery the end of May and stayed pretty close to home the rest of the year. I'll sure give it a good try to make it to Rapid City for the next reunion. I'm feeling fine now.

Keep up the good work you do on the newsletter and organizing the reunions. Enclosed is my membership for two years.

Dave Diedrich

D Battery

P.S. My typing is not much better than my hand writing.

This is Dave's wife Phyllis.

Dave had brain surgery the end of May - blood clot on the brain. He is doing OK. I see many changes in him - please excuse his typing. I let him do things for himself.

Phyllis

1/8/05

From: **Don Jackson** (554<sup>th</sup> Ord)

Bob,

Here are my dues for 05. Sorry I couldn't make it to San Antonio.

Also, could you give me the addresses of Sarge S.B. Davis and Ron O'Neill. I have some old pictures I'd like to share with them.

Sincerely,

Don Jackson

(Yang Mei meant plum trees)



1/10/05

From: **Gilberto Garcia** (A Btry)

Mr. Bob,

I am Gilberto Garcia, and have been trying to attend a reunion since I retired and, returned

to the States (USA) on 26 February 2002, but never could get sufficient funds. I have been a member since quiet a long time. I will attend the next one God willing. I am disabled 100% but, I can still walk and dance a little.

I have never been awarded any recognition for my service with A Btry. 2nd of 71st back in the 1958 crisis. Tell me what I must do. Please.

1/10/05

From: **Herb Terbille** (B Btry)

Bob,

Just got the Dec 04 news letter and enjoyed it very much as always. Thank you.

Just noticed I am behind on my dues so a check is in the mail.

By the way that guy standing next to Bob Douglas in the B battery photo isn't Breder it's me. (Sorry Herb. Ed.)

Herb Terbille

1/30/05

From: **Bob Jarrell** (D Btry)

Dear Friends:

I do not know if you have heard but Donald L. Lane, D Btry, passed away on 24 Jan 2005, his funeral will be 31 Jan 05.

Take care,  
Bob

1/31/05

From: **Glen Ramsey** (A Btry)

Hi Bob,

Happy New Year!!!! The reunion was great as usual. You and Lois continue to delight us each time. I especially liked the format giving more time for individual choices. The medal from the Taiwanese was a welcome surprise, and I really appreciated it. Our "Band of Brothers" earned it and more.

One last thing, I've checked the roster and I don't see a man named DAY; first name Charles I think. I know he was in launcher section. I think he was from CA.

Anyway, my best to Lois, and have a great year.  
Glenn Ramsey

2/9/05

From: **Vern Trupp** (D Btry)

Greetings from Idaho:

Has been a very warm winter! If you and the rest of the country wasn't so greedy with the snow and rain, you have kept us warm and "DRY!" This winter snow pack and reservoirs are 57% of normal! The storms go over us then dip down over the divide.

My shoulder is slowly healing. Been told it will take 7 months to year to heal. Doctor said I'd only have 60% use of shoulder and arms, but going to try for more.

Well have a great year.

Looking to 2006!!!

Vern

2/10/05

From: **Jim Peoples** (D Btry)

Hello Bob and Lois,

Hope all is well with you folks.

Before I forget again, I'm sending my dues. Sorry I'm so late.

Also, thank you so much for all the work for that spectacular reunion.

Sincerely,

Jim

3/4/05

From: **Nancy O'Neill (Ron, D Btry)**

Dear Bob:

I thought I would let you Ron passed away very suddenly yesterday afternoon. He was rushed to the hospital, but the doctors could not save him. His heart must have given out. The children, Curtis and Valerie, and I will be making the

arrangements today.

I want to let you know how special the re-unions had been for him. We both always had a great time. They hold a very special place in my heart—very fond memories.

Sincerely,  
Nancy O'Neill

3/24/05

From: **Joe Dougherty** (Hq & C Btry)

Bob:

New E Mail address. It's joedougherty@cox.com.

Is it possible that you could E Mail me all the troops e-mail addresses. I lost all of them when I changed ISP. I keep trying to import them from old address book, but does not work for me. I just don't know that much about PC's.

Wish was not disabled otherwise would attend the reunions. Possible could have reunion in Phoenix and I could attend.

4/10/05

From: **Dave O'Connell** (D Btry)

Bob,

At long last we have finally located **Harold McDonald**, known affectionately as "Little Mac" to the D Battery guys.

His address is:

W3035 U.S. Highway 12 and 16

Lyndon Station, WI 53944

Tel. (608) 666-4803


**Vern Trupp** found his hometown on an old set of orders. I put it into the computer and "walla". He was real surprised to get a call after all these years. Asked about a few of the guys and I told him he will probably be getting some calls. 70 years of age, Little Mac, an eligible bachelor, is retired from farming. He and his brother sold their farm but kept 60 acres and some outbuildings. He tells me he's not so little anymore and works part time for a farmer down the road. Give him a call guys. He may not remember you at first but the more you talk the more he remembers. Blotted the whole Army thing out. We had quite a few laughs on the phone talking about Taiwan and going over names. etc.

Little Mac's phone number: (608) 666-4803

Cheers,

Dave

PS: Bob, Hope you and Lois are well and getting good weather. Karen and I got through the winter and pray for global warming



### Need E-mail Address

The following troops have changed their e-mail address and we need the new one:

**Larry Trieglaff**

## **Eisenhower's strategy in the Taiwan Strait drove a wedge between the Soviet Union and China.**

By Michael D. Pixley

**THE TRIUMPH OF CHINESE** Communist forces over Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang in 1949 and the latter's retreat to the island of Taiwan was regarded in the United States as a cataclysmic setback in the Cold War. Subsequently, however, as Mao Tse-tung's People's Republic of China threatened Chiang's Nationalist government on Taiwan, the mounting tensions in the Taiwan Strait provided President Dwight D. Eisenhower with an opportunity to implement a bold strategy of using nuclear pressure to divide a powerful Communist alliance.

In 1953 Eisenhower developed what his State Department's director of policy planning, Robert Bowie, described as a plan to "drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Chinese over time," adding, "This was based on the idea that there were deep potential differences of interest between the two, even though they were cooperating at the time."

Despite all indications of healthy Sino-Soviet entente, Eisenhower's wedge strategy became official in October 1953, with the formulation of National Security Council Policy 162/2, intended to apply "pressure on China, partly for the purpose of forcing it to depend on the Soviet Union."

Eisenhower's first opportunity to implement his strategy was the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. In August 1954, Mao issued threats as Chiang reinforced his Nationalist strongholds in the Quemoy and Matsu island groups, only miles away from the Chinese mainland. On September 3, Mao commenced a massive artillery bombardment of Quemoy. With characteristic skill, Eisenhower balanced his response, using the threat of tactical nuclear weapons to maximize pressure without becoming inextricably engaged in a Chinese war. In December 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that the current policy "will gradually include the use of atomic weapons as conventional weapons for tactical purposes." Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai decried that as "brandishing atomic weapons" in the Taiwan Strait, but took the threat seriously enough to order the evaluation of China's defenses and its military-industrial complex for nuclear vulnerability.

As Chinese shelling continued, Dulles warned on March 5, 1955, that U.S. forces were "equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets." Such thinly veiled references to tactical nuclear weapons communicated a reduction of restraint over using those smaller warheads. Eisenhower was more overt at a March 16 press conference. When asked about using tactical nuclear weapons if the Communists invaded the offshore islands, he responded: "In any combat where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I can see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else .... Yes, of course they would be used."

A week after that declaration, Chou En-lai announced: "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have war with the U.S.A. The Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. government." On May 1, 1955, China ceased its eight-month bombardment of Quemoy.

While Eisenhower's immediate objectives to deter Chinese designs against Taiwan were obvious, his nuclear pressure simultaneously supported his wedge strategy. During the crisis, on February 10, 1955, Eisenhower wrote British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: "I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time in fact, I do not believe that even if we became engaged in a serious fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own forces .... I am convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we could conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia's treaty with Red China comprehends a true military alliance, which she probably would either have to repudiate or take the plunge. She would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion." That view was reinforced by national intelligence estimates that Moscow would not risk war as long as Soviet interests and China's survival were not threatened.

Just as Eisenhower strained Communist relations, he was keenly aware that Mao also intended to strain the British-American alliance. Despite disagreements over the Taiwan Strait situation, Eisenhower and Churchill worked tirelessly to guard Anglo-American entente. In a February 10, 1955, letter, Eisenhower thanked his octogenarian friend: "I have heard how earnestly you supported ... the proposition that nothing must create a serious rift in British-American relationships. Not only do I applaud that sentiment but I am most deeply grateful to you for your successful efforts .... There is no question in my mind that one of the principal reasons for [China's] constant pressing on the Asian frontier is the hope of dividing our two countries." He expressed to Churchill his firm conviction that "nothing is ever going to separate us or destroy our unity .... We must show no lack of firmness in a world where our political enemies exploit every sign of weakness, and are constantly attempting to disrupt the solidarity of the free world." Churchill replied that he and his government "deeply desire to do our utmost to help you and our strongest resolve is to keep our two countries bound together in their sacred brotherhood."

**FOLLOWING THE FIRST CRISIS**, in May 1957, Eisenhower deployed nuclear-capable Matador cruise missiles in Taiwan. Continued introduction of smaller tactical nuclear warheads further concerned Chinese leaders, as did an April 1958 announcement that the Defense Department was considering deploying intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Taiwan. Discussing the matter before the Chinese Eighth Party Congress in May 1958, Mao said: "We have no experience in atomic war, so how many will be killed cannot be known. The best outcome may be that only half of the population is left.... We are afraid of atomic weapons and at

the same time we are not afraid of them.... We do not fear them because they cannot fundamentally decide the outcome of a war; we fear them because they really are mass-destruction weapons.”

Eisenhower’s pressure during the first crisis convinced Mao that China needed its own nuclear weapons. On January 15, 1955, he discussed the matter with scientists and the Communist Party secretariat. He sought technical aid from Moscow and on October 15, 1957, the USSR secretly agreed to assist China’s nascent nuclear program.

By 1958, however, Moscow had become exceedingly wary of Chinese ambitions in the Taiwan Strait. While Nikita Khrushchev was advocating his peaceful coexistence policy to avoid nuclear war, Mao was provoking the United States and eliciting nuclear threats from Eisenhower. During a meeting in Beijing on August 1, Khrushchev became exasperated with Mao’s seeming indifference to Eisenhower’s pressure. He was especially infuriated when Mao referred to America as a “paper tiger.” He later recalled, “I tried to explain to him that one or two missiles could turn all the divisions in China to dust, but he wouldn’t even listen to my arguments and obviously regarded me as a coward.”

As a show of insolence, Mao gave Khrushchev no indication of his plans to provoke another crisis in the strait, later stating, “the islands are two batons that keep Khrushchev and Eisenhower dancing.” On August 23, 1958, Mao ordered another massive bombardment of Quemoy and openly threatened invasion. Eisenhower immediately ordered two additional aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait and subsequently authorized U.S. pilots to pursue hostile aircraft over China if fired upon. Dulles warned Beijing that any “naked use of force” would pose an issue far transcending the offshore islands and even the security of Taiwan. [It would] forecast a widespread use of force in the Far East which would endanger vital free world positions and the security of the United States.

Shocked at Mao’s recklessness, Khrushchev sent Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Beijing. Arriving on September 6, Gromyko expressed deep concern that the situation might escalate into total war. Robert Bowie recalled that 1954 crisis was merely a source of tension and controversy with them, but by the second crisis in 1958, I think the Chinese probably drew the conclusion that these so-called allies, the Soviets, were not very helpful.”

**THE SECOND CRISIS** convinced Khrushchev that he could not trust Mao with nuclear weapons, and in June 1959, just months after the crisis ended, Moscow abrogated its 1957 nuclear aid agreement and recalled its experts. Later that summer, Khrushchev and Mao met for the last time in Beijing, where their talks frequently degenerated into shouting matches. Furious that Mao had not warned him before shelling Quemoy, Khrushchev declared that “in our day only madmen and maniacs” advocate war, “co-existence is the only ... path to take; any other way means death and destruction for all of us.” He later warned Mao that those who brand the United States a paper tiger should remember “the paper tiger has nuclear teeth.” Meanwhile, China’s

position was that nuclear war with the United States would result in a Communist civilization “thousands of times higher than the capitalist system.” From such an apocalyptic war Mao stated, “China ... is sure to emerge the victor.... The sooner they make war the sooner they will be wiped from the face of the earth.” Following the explosive 1959 meeting, Mao concluded that under the existing complex international conditions, our policy is to resist pressure ... from two directions, Khrushchev and Eisenhower.” In 1964 China’s People’s Daily stated that “the Soviet Communist Party leaders have completely reversed enemies and comrades ... and are bent on seeking a Soviet-United States cooperation for the domination of the world.”

In the 1960s, Eisenhower’s wedge strategy was vindicated as China and the USSR drifted apart. In spite of the withdrawal of Soviet aid, China detonated an atomic bomb in 1964 and a hydrogen bomb in 1967. Soon after that, Moscow began sounding out the United States and Europe for support in the event of a Sino-Soviet war.


On March 3, 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces clashed along the Amur River while the Soviets began moving 40 divisions to the border. As hostilities escalated, worldwide media reported Chinese preparations for a nuclear exchange that included extensive digging of shelters in Beijing and other cities. Meanwhile, Moscow planned a preemptive strike on the main Chinese nuclear facility at Lop Nor. According to the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, “our [Central Intelligence Agency] estimated that the chances of an iron [conventional] bomb attack by the Soviet Union on China was one in three.... China’s reaction, of course, was that they looked to the United States. That was the beginning of the rapprochement.”

In July 1970, Moscow proposed a “joint retaliatory action” agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in response to any provocative acts or direct attacks by China. American policy at that time, however, was to oppose Soviet hegemony in Asia. Ambassador Green recalled the thinking at the time was that “if the Soviet Union gained an upper hand in a war against China, it was in our interests to support China so that it prevented China from being overtaken by the Soviet Union.”

When Eisenhower established his wedge strategy in 1953, he had no evidence that conditions would favor it so thoroughly or that his pressure in the Taiwan Strait would so effectively exacerbate Sino-Soviet differences. With Mao providing favorable circumstances, Eisenhower performed a strategic balancing act using nuclear pressure to support his wedge strategy while avoiding escalation into war with China. Certainly Eisenhower must have agonized over his decisions during the crisis, but his strategy provided a framework for effective action. The final result was a grand strategic victory that ultimately led to rapprochement with China. MH

United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower confer at Geneva, Switzerland, in July 1955. Four months earlier, they had threatened China with nuclear retaliation.

The previous article was from the Military History Magazine, February 2005. <<http://www.thehistorynet.com>>



## STRAIT TALK:

### AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA OVER TAIWAN

BY MONTE R. BULLARD

<http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/>

#### The Second Cross Strait Crisis of 1958[61]

On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) artillery units lobbed approximately 42,000 shells onto Jinmen.[62] Again, the primary motivation for the attack was political; similar to that of the 1954-55 crisis. The first purpose was to drive the United States out of the Taiwan area by highlighting the danger of another (after Korea) U.S. – China war over a couple of insignificant offshore islands. Many observers, however, interpreted the shelling as the beginning of the use of force to solve the Taiwan problem and a prelude to an invasion.[63] The Chinese believed such a war would not be popular with the Congress or American people. It was another Chinese miscalculation at a time when the anti-communist mood in the country was still strong. The shelling did, however, bring some pressure on the U.S. government to solve the problem. U.S. public opinion and most world nations believed Taiwan had provoked the attack and that the U.S. should sever the offshore islands from the issue of Taiwan defense.

Part of the rationale for the shelling resulted from a U.S. Department of State memorandum that explained the U.S. non-recognition of China. It stated that “communism's rule in China is not permanent and that one day it will pass.”[64] That statement provided the reason behind the U.S. supporting the Nationalists and the rationale for not having a “Two China” policy.

This crisis started at a time, in the summer of 1958 when Ambassadorial Talks in Geneva, the only place where the U.S. and China had official contact, became stalemated. The U.S. wanted China to renounce the use of force and release Americans held in China. China responded with the demand that the U.S. withdraw all forces from the area of Taiwan and stop trying to create “two Chinas.”[65] On July 28, the U.S. suggested any contact between the two sides be accomplished in Warsaw where both sides had embassies. China delayed a response so there was a period in which there was no official channel of communication between the two sides. On September 5, China agreed to resume talks believing

their position had strengthened because of their efforts in Jinmen.

This crisis involved the United States in three important ways. President Eisenhower stated that the offshore islands were important to the defense of Taiwan and were part of the U.S. defense system that extended from Japan through the island chains to the Philippines.[66] As a result the U.S. again sent in the U.S. Seventh Fleet to escort supply ships to Jinmen and Mazu to break the attempted blockade. China, on September 4, 1958 went on record to claim its territorial waters extended to 12 miles, but the U.S. only recognized a three-mile limit and escorted ships to within three miles. The statement explicitly included Taiwan and the offshore islands in the claim. Secondly, the U.S. constructed a large U.S. Airbase outside the city of Taichung in Taiwan. It was capable of handling B-52s, the most dangerous strategic weapon of the time. Finally, the U.S. deployed into Taiwan Matador missiles which carried tactical nuclear warheads.[67] The U.S. and China were again on the brink of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons were not removed from Taiwan until 1974.[68]

China, during the period from August 23 to October 4, bombarded Jinmen with 444,433 artillery rounds. At the same time, the U.S. increased their supply of weapons to Taiwan. They added eight-inch howitzers and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Taiwan's Air Force maintained superiority in the air and shot down 31 Communist airplanes.[69]

U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, also on September 4, 1958, made a forceful statement about U.S. support for Taiwan and the offshore islands and planned a trip to Taiwan. Shelling was increased just before he visited Taiwan on October 20. Again, the Communists were making a political statement with their artillery. On October 23, the United States and Taiwan issued a joint communique of resolve to defend Taiwan and the offshore islands. Once the Communists were convinced that the U.S. was going to continue to support Taiwan and that the shelling was having the wrong impact on the U.S. – Taiwan relationship, on October 25, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai announced an unprecedented “even-day” cease fire and shelling continued only on odd-days of the month. On the same day Peng made an appeal to the Taiwanese to unify with China. On June 17-18, 1960, however, they couldn't resist making an “artillery point” by increasing the shelling (approximately 86,000 shells) during President Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan.[70] The political shelling on odd-days lasted until January 1, 1979; the day the U.S. formally recognized China. It was a constant reminder that China and Taiwan were still at war.


Throughout the 1958 crisis the Communists made it clear that the attack was on “Taiwan”, and that the shelling of Jinmen was an integral part of the liberation of Taiwan. They did not want to get the offshore islands back without Taiwan. On November 1, Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated that “the offshore islands and Taiwan must be liberated together.”[71] That statement made it easier for the U.S. to invoke the Formosa Resolution and make a strong showing by taking

away the argument by domestic and international critics that the U.S. should separate the offshore islands problem from the defense of Taiwan. A legal case for US support was made in December 1958 by pointing out that there was no formal ceding of Taiwan to China and contrary to the UN Charter; China was trying to take territory that did not belong to it by force. The U.S. was viewed by some as protecting Taiwan in accordance with international law.

The crisis part of the U.S. – China confrontation ended in November and December as the shelling became routine on odd-days. Tensions continued, but it was no longer a crisis and it was no longer believed that the shelling was a prelude to an invasion of the main island of Taiwan.


China considered the United States to be the power in control of Taiwan. In March, 1959, at a meeting with Latin American Communist and Workers’ Party leaders, Chairman Mao Zedong stated:

“We do not want conciliation with the U.S.A. The United States must submit to us. Otherwise we do not wish to enter into negotiations with them. It is unimportant if they do not return Taiwan to us for another 100 years. If they do not recognize us, then we have no desire to recognize them either. . . .”



## 2nd Missile Bn, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association Officers:

President/Treasurer	<b>Bob Mackintosh</b>
Vice President	<b>John Spegele</b>
Secretary	<b>Dave O’Connell</b>
Asst. Secretary	<b>Charlie Trost</b>
Board Member	<b>Walt Lapsley</b>
Board Member	<b>S.B. Davis</b>
Board Member	<b>Ray Corbin</b>



## Membership Dues

The 2005 membership year started 1 November 2004. If you would like to start, or continue, your membership in the 2nd Missile Bn, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association, please submit your \$15.00 to Robert Mackintosh, 2-71 (Taiwan) Assn, 271 Shady Oak Drive, New Market, AL 35761. If you are currently a member, or have recently been a member, your membership expiration date will show on your newsletter address label.

