


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By William R. Frye United Nations Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor...

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United States Carrier Midway Takes On Fuel During Formosa Strait Patrol

Chiang Threatens Air War; Formosa Clouds Bestir UN

By William R. Frye

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United Nations, N.Y.

The 13th annual United Nations General Assembly is opening in an atmosphere of Sino-American crisis combined, curiously enough, with a gesture of Soviet-American rapprochement.

To observers, the contrast between Communist China's belligerent behavior in Formosa Strait and Moscow's agreement to sit down Nov. 10 and talk about ways to prevent surprise attack is too striking to miss.

There is at least a broad hint, they believe, that the Soviet Union, despite its verbal support of Peking, is nonetheless interested in taking the worst of the sting out of the crisis Peking's fervor has stirred up.

Inside the UN General Assembly, which reflects the outside world with considerable accuracy despite the absence of Peking—the Chinese Communists almost certainly will be denied a seat once again—there is a similar curious mixture of hope and dismay.

On the subject of disarmament, there is hope. On Oct. 31,

East and West are due to begin negotiating an inspected ban on nuclear-weapons tests. On Nov. 10, the date Moscow now proposes, there presumably will be technical East-West talks on how to bar surprise attack. This is a subject the West long has wanted to discuss.

Hopeful on Disarmament

Both the test ban and elimination of surprise are considered feasible first steps toward atomic arms control, and many UN diplomats say they think both sides now may be willing to act as well as talk about such steps. For the first time in more than ten years of negotiation, therefore, actual disarmament agreements seem possible.

This fact in itself would explain the hope. But in Western circles, there is the added fact that were no test-ban negotiations in prospect, the Western world, and particularly the United States, would have been in a very difficult position when the subject arose at the current Assembly.

With Soviet tests halted, and both British and American tests under way, there certainly would have been extraordinary pressure on the United States and Britain to abandon their programs. A new American test series is due to begin immediately in Nevada.

Gromyko Asks Debate

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, apparently believing he can exploit the situation despite the Geneva prospect, demanded Sept. 16 that the subject be put on the Assembly agenda under special emergency procedure.

The West, however, has a ready-made answer: that nothing should be done by the UN except to wish the Geneva talks well. The argument that the UN should not interfere with negotiations being handled elsewhere is almost always persuasive with UN delegates, and thus there is every prospect that the Gromyko propaganda offensive will be blunted.

On virtually all topics except disarmament, prospects appear bleak. Dismay outweighs hope.

U.S. Stand Unpopular

The American posture in the Far East—apparent determination to defend the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu—is thoroughly unpopular in the Assembly and is considered certain to come in for outspoken criticism both from neutrals and from friends.

Some observers speculate that the United States will welcome a certain amount of international pressure in the direction of a cease-fire, since that pressure would help to free Washington from Chinese Nationalist influences tending in the opposite direction. Nationalist China has said it opposes both a cease-fire and the renunciation of force in the area.

It would be difficult, however, if not impossible, for the United States to arrange to have the UN Assembly twist its arm enough to counteract Taipei but not so much as to strengthen Peking's bargaining position.

Difficulties Sighted

The likelihood is that the United States will attempt to fend off all pressure—and that it will find the task very trying indeed.

Washington is in an unenviable position on several other prospective Assembly issues as well. The United States is seeking to go slow on space disarmament—that is, on international control of the military uses of outer space. Washington is suggesting instead international cooperation in the peaceful uses of space.

The Soviet Union, which would stand to benefit strategically if the technology of space weapons were to be frozen at its present level, says it favors both space disarmament and "space for peace." Moscow thus is acknowledged to be in a stronger propaganda position than Washington on this important issue.

On the Middle East, the Assembly awaits a report from Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on the results of his recent peace mission. But there is no outward sign that he succeeded in persuading the Arab states to accept the kind of "UN presence" that would—in the language of the Assembly's recent unanimous resolution—"facilitate" a British-American troop withdrawal from Jordan and Lebanon.

By Courtney Sheldon

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Washington

With the United States now integrating powerful forces into the Formosan defense complex, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is threatening to use his air force to sever the Communist blockade of the Quemoy.

The Chiang maneuver undoubtedly is acquiesced in by the United States. A major aim of the United States in relieving the Chinese Nationalists of some of the responsibility for defending their home base is to permit more effective use of Nationalist forces in defense of the Quemoy.

Whether the United States will give General Chiang the final go-ahead and risk broadening the present ground artillery and limited naval warfare into an aerial combat is not certain yet.

It is assumed here, however, that the threat to bomb Chinese Communist artillery installations may strengthen the United States hand in negotiations with the Communists at Warsaw.

[Meanwhile, in Newport, R.I., President Eisenhower talked

by telephone with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles regarding the Far East situation and other international problems, the Associated Press reported. Mr. Eisenhower got a report from Mr. Dulles, who is in New York for the United Nations General Assembly session, on latest developments in the Formosa Strait area. They also discussed the speech Mr. Dulles will make later in the week at the UN Assembly.]

Retaliation Outlined

Nationalist artillery on the Quemoy has been unable to silence the coastal batteries of the Communists. This has enabled the Communists to turn the pressure on and off to suit their own military and diplomatic purposes.

In an interview with an American newsmen in Taipei, General Chiang declared:

"Your people and ours are working closely together to improve the convoy system, . . . but there is no solution. You cannot supply 130,000 soldiers and civilians by improving the convoy system when all supplies have to be landed on open beaches under heavy fire. . . ."

"There is only one real solution. . . . It's happened before. The last time the Communists attempted a really big artillery attack on Quemoy was Sept. 3, 1954. When we retaliated by attacking the Communist gun positions with our planes, artillery attack on Quemoy was stopped at once."

Possibilities Scanned

The generalissimo's confidence that plane bombardments would end the Communist threat this time without broadening the conflict perilously is not shared universally.

It is possible, nevertheless, that the Chinese Communists would merely try to fight off the Nationalist bombers and not follow them back to their American-protected bases on Formosa.

If a further military step is dictated to break the blockade, Pentagon strategists in Washington tend to prefer bombing by planes, preferably Nationalist, to close-in shore bombardment by United States ships.

There is ample sea room for the Navy to maneuver near the Communist artillery fortifications, and shipboard guns are both accurate and of reasonably long range—five miles for destroyers and 12 miles for cruisers. Navy planes, however, might be able to do the job with less risk to Navy ships.

It remains a question here or whether the Navy would really be of any help at the beachheads themselves if the Nationalist supply ships were escorted that far. At present, the Navy halts about three miles away from the beaches.

To order the Navy ships close in would be a calculated dare. If the Communists fired at the ships, presumably they would pull away from the islands and fire at the Communists from points closer to the artillery emplacements.

Missile Sites Rushed

The United States began to relieve the Nationalists of the formal responsibility of defense of Formosa last week with the assignment of United States fighter protection as night cover.

Now the Pentagon has confirmed that a Nike-Hercules antiaircraft missile battalion is being sent to the Pacific.

News reports from Formosa have already told of rush efforts to build missile-launching sites. The Army's Nike-Hercules will supplement the Air Force's Matador missiles, which have been available on Formosa for about a year.

The Tactical Air Command, meanwhile, continues to bring in portions of a composite striking force from the United States.

The latest United States Air Force additions in Formosa were a squadron of F-104A Star fighters, said to be the fastest jet in the world. They could reach the Chinese mainland from Formosa in about five minutes.

Pentagon officials still stress that there is no contemplated use for the ground forces of the Army and the Marine Corps, as in Lebanon. General Chiang is assumed to have more than enough troops for defensive purposes.